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 Abstract - Game-theoretic models provide a rigorous 
mathematical modelling framework, but tractability 
considerations keep them simple. In contrast, Evolutionary 
Simulation Models (ESMs) may be complex, but can lack 
rigour. We demonstrate that careful synthesis of the two 
techniques provides improved insights into the processes 




Evolutionary systems are of interest to both biologists and 
computer scientists. For the former, they represent 
challenging objects of study. For computer scientists, they are 
both a source of inspiration and increasingly a domain within 
which computational techniques are being profitably applied. 
Traditionally, biologists have tended to use mathematical 
methods to model biological systems. In the field of 
behavioural ecology, for example, game theory has been the 
preferred tool since it was first championed by Maynard 
Smith and Price in the early 1970s [1]. 
Computer scientists have used simulation models to 
explore similar systems with some success [2]. However, 
their uptake within the biological community has been 
limited by the perceived lack of rigour associated with 
simulation in comparison to equational modelling techniques 
[3]. Formal models are expected to explicitly present all of 
their assumptions and to provide an intelligible account of the 
moves leading to the model’s conclusions. Simulations, on 
the other hand, are often opaque, even to their designers [4]. 
Unlike the interpretation of mathematical models, 
understanding why a particular simulation model produces 
the results that it does is often a significant undertaking. As a 
result, even when the actual details of the implementation are 
made clear (which they are often not) by providing the source 
code, for example, simulation models are difficult to assess 
and appreciate. This sometimes leads to artefactual claims 
[5]-[6]. 
Despite the success of game theory modelling, it suffers 
from the same tractability limitations as all mathematical 
modelling techniques. While simple games can be analysed 
fairly easily, including more detail often renders models 
effectively insoluble. This has not been a severe problem in 
behavioural ecology partly because theoreticians have been 
interested in quite simple games with few equilibria. These 
simple models have thrown light on many important 
questions, but further exploration often requires addressing 
more complicated scenarios. 
We believe that this is best accomplished by using game-
theoretical models as the basis for evolutionary computer 
simulation modelling. Wedding the two approaches may 
serve to overcome the limitations of each—the perceived lack 
of rigour in the simulation design, and the tractability 
constraints on mathematical modelling. 
One might consider a game-theoretic model to represent 
the pure selective force driving an evolutionary system. This 
is because game theory assumes evolution takes place in a 
world where even the smallest of selective forces will 
eventually overcome any limitations [7]-[8]. The only 
constraints on evolutionary change imposed by a game-
theoretic model are that strategies must be drawn from the 
pre-defined strategy set. There are no genetic constraints, no 
developmental limitations, no noise, no fitness landscapes to 
traverse, etc., there are only evolutionarily stable strategies 
(An ESS is defined as a strategy, or mixtures of strategies, 
that, when prevalent, cannot be invaded by any others). 
In contrast, an evolutionary simulation model immediately 
introduces evolutionary constraints, many of which might be 
described as “logistic” factors. These factors would include 
stochastic effects such as noisy fitness functions or sampling 
errors, and genetic constraints, which govern how far one 
strategy is from another across a fitness landscape. In 
addition, population structure, direct vs. indirect costs, life 
history strategies and other influences are also often brought 
to bear upon the evolutionary process being modelled. It is, 
of course, possible to include these kinds of constraints in a 
game theory model, but only at the cost of greatly 
complicating the mathematics required to obtain a solution.  
Importantly, a simulation modelling approach also enables 
a researcher to study any non-ESS, transitory phenomena. 
This is particularly important with systems that have non-
stable or multiple equilibria, as well as potentially revealing 
system behaviours that might give an indication of an 
evolutionary trajectory toward an ESS. Just because a 
behaviour is not an ESS does not necessarily mean that it will 
rarely be observed. Commonly occurring transitory 
phenomena also require explanation. 
In the remainder of the paper we will apply both game 
theory and evolutionary simulation modelling techniques to 
an important problem in biology. Our primary aim is to 
demonstrate that the synthesis of both techniques provides a 
better understanding of the problem than game theory alone, 
but we also aim to contribute to the biological literature on 
the evolution of honest signalling systems. 
 
II. THE EXAMPLE PROBLEM 
 
One problem that has been studied extensively through 
both game-theoretic [9]-[10] and evolutionary simulation 
modelling [11] approaches is the discrete action-response 
game, which models communication between individuals 
who may or may not have a conflict of interest. In the 
majority of cases, only one modelling technique was used. 
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We will take Hurd’s game theoretic model of the evolution 
of honest handicap signalling and by implementing it as an 
evolutionary simulation, demonstrate that the game theory 
does not tell the whole story of the system’s behaviour. To 
give an idea of the basis of the model, we present the 
important equations of the game theory below. 
The popularity of the problem is due to the difficulty that 
modellers have had with the concept of the handicap 
principle, as proposed by Zahavi [12]. He suggested that for 
signallers to be honest where conflicts of interest exist, 
signals must be costly, i.e., a handicap. Thus, for example, a 
high quality peacock can “afford” to bear the cost of a larger 
tail than one of lower quality. Despite widespread interest in 
Zahavi’s idea, it took around 15 years from its first 
publication for a successful model to prove its validity. 
Grafen’s game-theoretical proof demonstrated this and also 
required the condition that signals must be more costly for 
low-quality individuals to make, where quality is of interest 
to the signal receiver [13]-[14]. For example, this could be 
the genetic quality of a displaying male for a female choosing 
a mate. 
A competing view of signal system evolution, which has 
fallen out of favour since the rise of the handicap principle, 
proposes that signallers and receivers may settle upon cheap 
conventions with which to convey information to their 
mutual advantage, e.g., red insect colouration might indicate 
unpalatability to birds [15]. There is nothing to prevent these 
conventions from being abused by free-loaders, mimics and 
cheats, e.g., red insects which nevertheless are tasty food for 
birds. As the prevalence of these abusers grows, the value of 
the signal deteriorates until the signalling system collapses 
under the weight of its own infidelity. Partly as a result of the 
inherent instability featured in this account, it has been 
neglected in favour of the handicap principle’s stable 
equilibria.  
A signaller, S, is given an internal state, z, which only they 
know but which is of interest to a receiver, R. This state will 
either be H, representing high quality, or L, representing low 
quality. On the basis of this state, the signaller makes a 
signal,  s, to which the observer makes a response, r. The 
signal will either be East (E) or West (W) and the response 
will be either Up (U) or Down (D).  
An example of this system might be male blackbirds 
signalling to females in the hope of eliciting a mating 
opportunity. Imagine a female blackbird flying about and 
suddenly observing a male blackbird sitting in a tree. He also 
observes her and can do one of two things. He could remain 
inactive (East) and hope she flies over or he can start singing 
in the hope that she will be attracted by it (West). The female 
having observed the male’s action could either ignore him 
(Down) or fly over and mate with him (Up).  
Note that there is no reason why, for example, the cost of 
signalling East should not be higher than signalling West or 
vice versa, or that High state males should find signalling 
East cheaper than Low state males or vice versa.  
The game can be played in many ways, but Hurd 
concentrated upon the version in which the signallers always 
want to get an Up response from the observer, but the 
observer only wishes to give that response to a signaller with 
a High internal state. This generates a conflict of interest that 
makes the solution non-trivial.  
The participants in the game are given a fitness score 
determined by how successful they have been. In game 
theoretical terms these would be: 
 
) , ( ) ( s z c r v wS − =        (1) 
) , ( r z v wR =           ( 2 )  
 
In equation 1 wS is the fitness score of the signaller, v is the 
value of the receiver’s response, and c  is the cost of the 
signaller’s action given his internal state. In equation 2 wR is 
the fitness score of the receiver, and v is the value of the 
receiver’s response given the signaller’s internal state. 
The relative cost of signalling can be defined as: 
 
) , ( ) , ( E H c W H c CH − =      (3) 
) , ( ) , ( E L c W L c CL − =       (4) 
 
This defines CH as the difference in cost for a High quality 
signaller between signalling West and East. CL is the 
equivalent for the Low quality signaller. Honest signalling is 
defined arbitrarily as High state signallers making the West 
signal while Low state signallers make the East signal. Hurd 
went on to show that honest signalling is only an ESS when: 
 
H L C V C > >            ( 5 )  
 
Where V is the value of the receiver’s Up response to the 
signaller. Other models have explored cases in which the 
value of the Up response is not the same for High and Low 
state signallers, but in our model V is insensitive to signaller 
state. This is represented graphically in Figure 1. 
The importance of equation 5 is that it contradicts Zahavi’s 
claim that signals must be costly in order to remain honest. 
According to (5), signalling could remain stable despite CH 
being negative. This indicates, that as long as Low state 
signallers cannot afford to make an advertisement, it can 
remain honest, even if High state signallers pay nothing to 
make it, or are even better off making the advertisement than 
not. 
 
III. OUR MODEL 
 
In order to explore more fully the evolutionary dynamics 
of the action-response game, we constructed an evolutionary 
simulation that faithfully captures the structure of Hurd’s 
model. Due to the exclusivity of the signaller and receiver 
behaviours, a two population model is appropriate. A 
population of 100 signallers was coevolved against a 
population of 100 receivers over 1000 generations. At birth, 
each signaller was either determined to be High or Low 
(p=0.5). Each signaller’s strategy was defined by a two-bit 
genotype, where the first bit represented which action to 
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Fig 1. Graph showing where honest signalling is an ESS in Hurd’s model 
  
make when Low, and the second which action to make when 
High. The receiver's two-bit genotype represented which 
response to give when observing East and which to give 
when observing West. At the outset of coevolution, all genes 
were initially set randomly to either 1 or 0. 
The available signaller and receiver strategies are named in 
relation to Hurd’s arbitrary honest signalling scenario in 
which signallers signal West when High and East when Low, 
while receivers respond Up to West and Down to East. A 
Cynic never signals West, while a Bluffer always does. 
Honest signallers signal East when in the Low state and West 
in the High state, while dishonest signallers signal West in 
the Low state and East in the High state. A Generous receiver 
always responds Up, while a Mean receiver never does. A 
Believer responds Up to West and Down to East, while a 
Non-Believer behaves in the opposite manner. 
Each generation, every signaller was paired at random with 
a receiver. After playing the action-response game once, they 
were awarded scores according to the fitness functions 
defined above. Reproduction was determined by tournament 
selection with tournament size 2. During reproduction, each 
gene had a 3% chance of mutation. 
For each coevolutionary run, several parameters defined 
the cost and value of signalling and responding (see Figure 
1). Receivers were given a score of 100 if they gave an Up 
response to a High state signaller or Down to a Low state 
signaller, otherwise they received a zero score. The value of 
an Up response for a signaller was set to 100, while a Down 
response had zero value. The cost of both East and West 
behaviours for both High and Low state signallers was varied 
across runs from –100 to +100 in steps of 25. Each of the 
6561 combinations of cost parameters was replicated 20 
times. We have described the decisions involved in choosing 
these experimental parameters and the consequent effect on 
results in another paper [16]. 
For each run, the number of signallers in the final 
generation utilising each of the four possible strategies was 
counted. If the signaller population was behaving randomly, 
we would expect them to be distributed equally across the 
potential strategies with a binomial distribution, p=0.25, 
n=100. This gives a 95% confidence interval of 10-37. If the 
number of signallers using a particular strategy lies outside of 
this interval, we can deduce that the distribution is non-
random. For instance, if we observe that more than 37 Cynics 
in the final generation then we can be confident that there 
was some selection for this particular strategy. Conversely, if 
we observe less than 10 Cynics, we can infer that there has 
been selection against this course of action. For each of the 
20 runs carried out for each combination of cost parameters, 
the signaller and receiver populations were scored for each 
possible strategy (positive selection, negative selection, and 
no selection). 
It is common in signalling theory papers to concentrate on 
the signaller and to pay little or no attention to receiver 
strategy. This may be due to the perception that it is the 
signaller’s behaviour that is of interest; it is the phenomenon 
of honest signalling that is under investigation. However, it 
should be remembered that this is a coevolutionary problem 
and the receiver’s strategy is of equal importance in 
determining the behaviour of the signalling system. In 
recognition of this, the receiver strategy will be discussed 




A. Receiver  strategy 
We found that the mean and generous strategies are only 
ever used at a low level and there is no region of the 
parameter space within which they approach an ESS. This is 
a little surprising given the presence of areas where signallers 
are predominantly using the Cynic or Bluffer strategy. One 
might imagine that the Mean or Generous receiver strategies 
might do as well as any other in these areas. 
The believer and non-believer distributions are shown in 
Figure 2. These distributions are rotationally symmetrical. 
One item of note is that the area of the parameter space that 
results in significant numbers of Believer strategists not only 
coincides with the area that game theory predicts should 
favour Honest signallers, as one would expect, but is actually 
more widespread. Likewise, Disbelief is not limited to the 
area of the parameter space predicted by game theory. Why 
are receiver strategies sometimes favoured in the absence of 
the signalling strategy that justifies their existence? 
Confronted with, for example, a uniform population of 
cynics, receivers cannot glean any information concerning 
signaller state from signaller behaviour. Regardless of 
whether signallers are High or Low, they always move East. 
In such a situation each of the four receiver strategies are, on 
average, equally successful, scoring 100 roughly half the time 
and zero for the remainder. Given such a scenario, in the 
perfect world of game theory (where idealizations such as 
infinite population size and fitness assessment in the limit are 
assumed to hold) each receiver strategy should be represented 
equally in the population. 
However, in a stochastic simulation with finite population 
size in which individuals are assessed over a small number of 






Area in which honest 
signalling can occur 
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Figure 2.Graphs showing the distribution of receiver strategies with respect 
to CH (X-axis) and CL (Y-axis). Increasingly heavy shading represents an 
increasing number of runs that display positive selection pressure for a 
strategy. Left to right: Believer, Non-believer 
 
signallers will convey no information about internal state is 
very low, since in each generation, mutation will generate a 
small number of non-ESS signallers. Given that Believers 
and Non-believers are the only strategists capable of 
exploiting any correlation between signaller internal state and 
behaviour, it is perhaps not surprising to see them outperform 
Mean and Generous strategists. 
But why should believers predominate above the line 
CH=CL with Non-believers below? It must be the case that 
the cost parameters above the line CH=CL are, to some 
perhaps quite small extent, biased in favour of Honesty (even 
outside the area of the parameter space admitting of an 
Honest signalling ESS). Likewise, below the line CH=CL, 
Dishonesty is favoured to some extent. Even a small number 
of either signaller strategy would be enough to tip the 
receiver population in favour of either Belief or Non-Belief. 
 
B. Signaller strategy 
Figure 3 clearly shows that honesty is observed under the 
ESS conditions predicted by the game-theoretic model. We 
can also appreciate which conditions favour the other three 
strategies. Note that considering the four graphs together, 
these results are also rotationally symmetrical, with honesty 
and dishonesty being ESS’s on opposite sides of the chart. 
This demonstrates that given appropriate signalling costs, 
East and West are effectively interchangeable as one would 
expect. Near the centre of the parameter space, there exist 
regions of that are not dominated by any particular strategy. 
The game-theoretic model suggests that absolute signalling 
costs are irrelevant to the stability of honest signalling. 
Rather it is the difference between the cost of East and West 
that is critical to stability. Each point on the graphs in Figure 
3 pools several runs with different cost parameters. Are there 
significant differences within these pooled results? Figure 4 
shows that there are not. Varying the cost of signalling East 
when in the Low state has no effect on the number of 
signallers using the honest strategy. As predicted, it is the 
relative cost, (CL) which determines this. Absolute costs are 
unimportant. This also holds for variation in the other 
absolute cost parameters. In combination with the rotational 
symmetry displayed by the graphs in Figure 3, this result 
allows us to greatly reduce the number of different cost 
values that we need to explore. 
   
 
Figure 3. Graphs showing the distribution of signaller strategies with respect 
to relative signalling costs CH (X-axis) and CL (Y-axis). Increasingly heavy 
shading represents an increasing number of runs that display positive 
selection pressure for a signalling strategy. Clockwise from top-left: Cynic, 























Figure 4. A graph showing the effect of CL on strategy frequency whilst 
varying the cost of signalling East. CH was held constant at 0 for all runs. 
 
Figure 4 also highlights an area of particular interest to us. 
The game theory suggests that we should see a sharp “phase 
transition” separating honest signalling from no honest 
signalling. Instead we see a gradual increase in the number of 
populations significantly using the honest strategy as we 
cross the predicted boundary in the parameter space. What is 
responsible for the low level of Honesty? 
The distribution of strategies over the graphs is 
summarised in Figure 5, with regions lacking a dominant 
strategy labelled NS. A closer examination of these areas 
suggests that honest signalling occurs under these conditions, 
but is not stable over time due to the presence of Bluffers.  
In order to gain a better idea of what was happening in the 
areas designated NS, we re-ran the experiment with a finer 
resolution. For this higher resolution experiment, the cost of 
signalling East was set to zero and the cost of signalling West 
varied between 0 and +100 in steps of 5 for each state. Figure  
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Figure 5. Graph showing the distribution of signaller strategies with respect 




Figure 6. Graphs showing a higher resolution of the distribution of signaller 
strategies with respect to CH (X-axis) and CL (Y-axis). Clockwise from top 
left: Cynic, Honest, Bluffer. The last graph shows the corresponding area on 





















Figure 7. Graph showing the number of individuals using the Honest, Bluffer 
and Believer strategies during one simulation run in the NS region. 
 
6 shows the higher resolution graphs, which confirm the 
presence of a non-ESS signalling strategy. This appears to 
take the form of a mixture of honest and bluffing strategies. 
This is of particular interest as it has often been theorised that 
such mixed strategies occur. Despite the fact that they are not 
ESS strategies, these transitory phenomena still occur 
frequently in this model.  
Figure 7 shows the number of individuals utilising a 
particular strategy over the course of a simulation run with 
the signal cost parameters CL=75, CH=25, which corresponds 
to the middle of the area marked NS on Figure 3. One can see 
that the numbers of Bluffers, Believers and Honest strategists 
are correlated. The initial increase in the frequency of the 
Believer strategy is probably due to stochastic effects, since 
against the background of predominant Cynicism the 
Believer strategy has the same fitness as the other three 
response strategies. However, once the frequency of Belief 
rises slightly above chance, this favours both Honest and 
Bluffer strategists, since they get an Up response from 
Believers. The increase in frequency of Honest strategists 
gives Believers a slight edge over their competitors, boosting 
the numbers of both. However, Bluffers are able to piggy- 
back on this trend. Eventually, the increasing numbers of 
Bluffers will devalue the Honest signal, leading to a crash as 
receivers abandon the believer strategy. This causes a 
corresponding reduction in the number of signallers using 
both the Honest and Bluffing strategies. The system returns 
once more to the non-signalling equilibrium at which 
signallers are Cynics and receivers are equally well off 




The results clearly show that an area of the parameter 
space outside of that predicted by game theory contains some 
honest signalling (Figure 8). The fact that it appears to be 
evolutionarily unstable explains why. However, it should be 
pointed out that although it is unstable it does appear in 
between 50% and 75% of the populations within the area. If 
one were to rely purely on the game-theoretic results, then it 
would be predicted that no honest signalling could occur in 
that area of the parameter space—signals are too cheap for 
the Low quality signallers, they will invade and destabilise 
any nascent signalling system. We show that significant 
periods of honesty will occur in these scenarios, but that it 
will be mixed with signallers using the Bluffer strategy, and 
that each evolved signalling system will be relatively short-
lived. It is important to realise that this is not just an arbitrary 
anomaly. As discussed earlier, within behavioural ecology, 
short-lived signalling systems of this type had been theorised 
to exist, but the notion of this type of cheap, but fragile 
signalling system has been displaced by theories of more 
stable handicap signalling systems.  
The extended areas of the Believer and Non-Believer 
strategies also require some explanation. The most likely 
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Figure 8. Graph showing where honest signalling occurs in our model, 
including an area not predicted by game theory. 
 
or Dishonest, signaller behaviour will provide some 
information about signaller state. If a source of this 
information exists, despite its unreliability, it will allow 
receivers to make a better than random choice. The question 




We have shown the utility of evolutionary simulation 
models in combination with game theory in relation to 
discovering potentially important results. The existence of 
ephemeral honest signalling will be of particular interest to 
biologists. Current dogma states that signals cannot be 
considered reliable unless they are costly. Our model shows 
that not only can relatively cheap signals allow some level of 
honest signalling, but that receivers are willing to tolerate 
some level of “cheating” by non-honest signallers. 
Biologists have become accustomed to only considering 
behaviours that have been shown to be an ESS. This is 
largely due to the success of game theory. However, now that 
the limits of the ability game theory to shed new light on the 
mechanisms involved in behavioural ecology may be in sight, 
it is time to consider additional theoretical methods.  
One can consider the discoveries due to the use of game 
theory to be a framework, we now need to begin filling in the 
gaps between the supports. Merely knowing the eventual 
evolutionary outcome of selective forces provides an 
unbalanced picture, which may be misleading when applied 
to the real world. By using simulation techniques we can 
discover both the evolutionary trajectories that may be 
followed and also the nature of ephemeral phenomena. Such 
equilibria may be more common than currently assumed. 
How many seemingly stable signalling systems in the natural 
world are actually transitory in nature? The use of simulation 
modelling may help empiricists to find out by both opening 
their eyes to the possibility and giving them some idea of 
which conditions favour these phenomena. 
Whilst we have concentrated upon the enhancement of 
game theory using simulation, there is no reason why this 
process should not work in reverse. This would entail a 
simulation being reverse engineered to produce a game-
theoretic model, which would show which parts of the 
simulation result are due to the selective forces acting on the 
phenomenon under investigation and which are due to the 
manner in which the simulation has been implemented. 
 
VII. Further Work 
 
Having demonstrated that logistics are important in signal 
evolution, there is ample scope to expand upon this work. 
Potential areas include exploring multiple signalling bouts, 
different receiver pay-off matrices, the effect of having the 
value of receiver response vary with signaller state, allowing 
the signaller’s internal state to vary over a lifetime and an 
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